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Abstract 
 
Mahr and Csibra make a compelling case for a communicative function of episodic 
remembering, but a less compelling case that this is its primary function. Questions arise on 
whether confirming their predictions would support their account sufficiently, on the 
communicative function of preserving rich nonbelieved memories, and on the epistemic 
benefits of developing false memories via the acceptance of misinformation.   
The target article contributes appreciably to the established literature exploring the social 
functions—among other functions—of accurate and inaccurate remembering (Bluck, Alea, 
Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Newman & Lindsay, 2009). Mahr and Csibra (M&C) prompt us 
to rethink our conception of these social functions; specifically, they propose that 
remembering is adaptive primarily because communicating our memories can lead others to 
share our beliefs. The case for this communicative function is compelling, and M&C’s 
account lays the ground for interesting new directions in empirical research, requiring novel 
methodological paradigms. But the case for the primacy of this function over other functions 
is currently unresolved. 
 
What kinds of empirical evidence would strongly support or falsify the primacy of 
communication? M&C make some reasonable predictions, but support for these can arguably 
only bolster confidence in the existence of a communicative function, not provide evidence of 
its primacy. For instance, the authors predict that people should engage in more conservative, 
effortful source monitoring whenever a prospective listener is likely to be skeptical. This 
prediction seems complementary to the literature demonstrating ‘audience-tuning’ effects on 
remembering (Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz, & Groll, 2008); more generally there is broad 
agreement that metacognition is strategic and goal-driven (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), and influenced by similar processes as is social persuasion 
(Blank, 2009; Leding, 2012; Nash, Wheeler, & Hope, 2015). But does this broad agreement 
confirm that episodic remembering must primarily serve communication? Not at all. Indeed, 
although communicative goals undoubtedly can motivate source monitoring, these goals do 
not necessarily take precedent over other self-serving goals. When a skeptic challenges the 
authority of our memories, for example, we seem in fact to systematically prefer cheap-and-
easy strategies, not reliable strategies, for verifying the truth (Nash, Wade, Garry, & 
Adelman, in press; Wade, Nash, & Garry, 2014).  
 
Additional questions arise when we stay on the matter of people disputing their own 
memories. M&C emphasize that believing in an event’s occurrence does not necessarily 
imply remembering the event; however, they omit to note that the converse is also true. That 
is to say, people frequently retain episodic memories of events that they no longer believe 
truly occurred (Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2012; Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 
2010; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013; Scoboria, Nash, & Mazzoni, in press). Importantly, 
these so-called nonbelieved memories often retain the rich, autonoetic phenomenology that 
typifies believed memories. Our ability to preserve these memories could be adaptive, given 
that our reasons for disbelieving any particular memory may themselves transpire to be 
misguided (Scoboria et al., 2014). But the existence and characteristics of nonbelieved 
memories must nevertheless tell us that autonoesis is more than simply “a proposition to the 
effect of ‘I had these experiences’” (M&C, p.12), and that episodic remembering cannot, by 
necessity, be epistemically generative. M&C must account for the durability of autonoesis in 
cases where a remembered event is not believed to have occurred.  
 
Although M&C do not discuss nonbelieved memories, they do give greater attention to the 
adaptiveness of false memories. Susceptibility to false memories might offer numerous 
specific benefits to the rememberer (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009; Howe, 2011; Nash, 
Berkowitz, & Roche, 2016), but M&C propose that this susceptibility is also generally 
adaptive, because convincing ourselves of self-serving beliefs is an essential first step toward 
convincing others. They further propose a reciprocal benefit: adopting other people’s beliefs 
into our own recollections can be “communicatively useful” as a means of enhancing our 
epistemic authority. Both of these proposals warrant scrutiny.  
 
First, is the adaptiveness of (false) remembering really contingent on whether or not we 
communicate our memories to others? Many examples of self-serving memories give cause 
for doubt: remembering plays well-documented roles in identity formation and maintenance, 
for instance, and so establishing positive self-regard—even if based on false beliefs—can 
provide important benefits to wellbeing (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Wilson & Ross, 
2003). Episodic remembering enables us to generate and preserve self-serving beliefs about 
our own past such as these, and also to generate the same self-serving beliefs in other people. 
But it seems counterintuitive to imply that the adaptive benefit of having others share our 
self-serving beliefs must be greater than the adaptive benefit of us holding those beliefs 
ourselves.  
 
Second, does altering our memories to accord with another person’s memories really afford 
greater epistemic authority? Suppose that Doris and Jack observe a theft, and Doris later 
claims that the thief had red hair, whereas Jack cannot recall the thief’s hair. M&C correctly 
note that people typically treat the richness and detail in others’ memory reports as signals of 
epistemic authority (Bell & Loftus, 1989); the authors therefore suggest that Jack could 
become an ostensibly more authoritative source by integrating detail from Doris’s memory 
into his own. Yet M&C might have equally noted that people are persuaded by good 
calibration: we trust witnesses who realize what they remember poorly, as well as what they 
remember well (Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007). In this sense, even patchy 
memories—not only detailed memories—can signal epistemic authority. This interpretation 
makes it more difficult to construe misinformation acceptance as necessarily adaptive: Jack 
could gain greater authority as a witness precisely because rather than accepting the 
misinformation, he maintains that he cannot remember the thief’s hair. Moreover, the benefit 
of accepting misinformation is even less clear in cases where memories are altered, rather 
than supplemented. Suppose that Jack initially recalls that the thief’s hair was brown, but 
nevertheless alters his recollection to accord with Doris’s (red hair). Here, Jack’s testimony 
neither becomes more detailed as a result of accepting the misinformation, nor necessarily 
becomes better calibrated. Once again, false remembering is unlikely to systematically 
enhance epistemic authority. 
 
On the whole, M&C position their communicative account of remembering as a challenger to 
popular “mental time travel” accounts, raising astute questions that cast doubt on whether 
remembering evolved primarily to serve future planning. But before resolving, instead, that 
remembering evolved primarily to serve communication, M&C too have critical questions to 
answer. 
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